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Vincent Reinhart, American Enterprise Institute
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the paper “The End of
Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Mar-
kets, 1815–2007.” Marc Flandreau, Juan Flores, Norbert Galliard, and
Sebastián Nieto‐Parra have written a careful and comprehensive study,
commendable in the manner in which they examine the mechanics of
sovereign debt issuance over the past 2 centuries. Having documented
the government sales of debt, they go on to offer a plausible mechanism
to explain changes in patterns over time.
Flandreauetal.directourattentiontomarketmechanisms,specifically
the middlemen in transactions or the entities that make the invisible
hand work. The events over the past 2 years have shown such focus to
be important, as it is precisely problems at those middlemen that help to
explain the contraction in financial trading, the increase in market
spreads, and the drying up of new lending recently witnessed. Concern
about such middlemen includes understanding their incentives, capital
positions, and balance sheets. In that regard, this paper takes to heart
limits of arbitrage arguments, which could help explain why financial
markets sometimes act at variance with what is expected from atomistic
agents exploiting all opportunities for trade.
1
To put it simply, the authors construct underwriting league tables
for four periods. They essentially recreate what Bloomberg magazine
would have looked like in the 1820s, 1870s, 1930s, and most recently.
They show how those league tables evolved in significant ways. They
then offer a plausible explanation that explains those changes by the
rising role of rating agencies. Before the dominance of rating agencies,
investment banks had the responsibility for signaling sovereign credit-
worthiness by supporting after‐issuance market making in that debt.
When rating agencies became the dominant purveyor of this stamp
of creditworthiness, investment banks laid off that responsibility
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underwritten.
The authors’ examination of the rise of rating agencies is eminently
plausible, but how much confidence can be placed given this sparse-
ness of the data? Figure 1 reports the number of observations for the
f o u rm a i np e r i o d se x a m i n e db yF l a n d r e a ue ta l .A si se v i d e n t ,t h e r e
is an order‐of‐magnitude difference between the most recent compared
to the prior three periods.
More fundamentally, observing that investment banks no longer play
acertifyingroledoesnotrevealiftheygaveupthatroleorwerereplaced.
As much as I like this paper, I am concerned that the authors rest too
much on a single potential mechanism explaining the change. I take that
changeasafactbecausetheauthorspresenttheirevidenceinsuchacom-
pelling fashion. But was it all rating agencies?
I believe that there are five plausible explanations for a shift in the role
of investment banks as certifying agents. First, there is the rise in rating
agencies as the authors suggest. Second, information costs have declined
considerablyoverthepast2centuries.Third,agencyproblemsmayhave
increased over time within the firms as financial institutions became
more complicated. Fourth, the loss i ns u p p o r to fs o v e r e i g nd e b ts a l e s
may have followed from a decline in a cross subsidy in which the sov-
ereign had received some compensation in return for other benefits it
provided investment banks. Finally, it may simply be a decline in con-
centration in the financial industry. I will address each of these five
Fig. 1. Number of observations. Source: Flandreau et al., n. 19
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and the policy implications of that change depend on which of the five
seems more plausible.
Flandreau et al. build the case for a changed role of the rating agen-
cies. Albrecht Ritschl, my fellow discussant, delves into that in detail, so
let us take that case as already established.
The second possibility I raised was that financial information has
gotten cheaper. For much of history, size and sophistication conveyed
an advantage. We all know the story of Rothschild’s network of carrier
pigeons that brought him the news of Wellington’s victory at Waterloo
before anyone else.
2 If some largefirms had advantages in collecting and
interpreting information about a sovereign, might they not show that in
which offerings they underwrote and which markets they supported?
And would they not be the same issues? Over time, as more firms learn
about market prospects and current prices because of the declining cost
of information, the advantage of large firms is eroded as is their support
of secondary markets. Only a little bit of introspection produces a long
list of innovations that have lowered the cost of information over time,
including the telegraph, the transatlantic cable, the telephone, satellite
transmission, and the Internet. International initiative also played a role,
important among them the International Monetary Fund’s standards on
the transparency of information about government accounts.
3
The third possibility that I offered was that perhaps big investment
banks have become more difficult to govern over time. The modern
financial firm is a large complicated institution, taking advantage of
tax and regulatory arbitrage in many different jurisdictions. Its balance
sheet has been fractured in the effort to avoid holding capital. Risks have
been sliced by the use of derivative instruments. In the United States, the
same entity may have to report to several different supervisory agencies.
And accounting roles are extraordinarily complicated, as is the tax code.
As a result, managers probably have a harder time monitoring employ-
ees. These monitoring problems were reflected in recent abuses of suit-
ability in lending and securitization. As the bond between principal and
agent weakens, employees no longer act in the longer‐term interest of
theirfirm.Insuchanenvironment,intertemporaltrades thatbenefitafirm’s
value by increasing its credibility are viewed, instead, on a transaction‐
by‐transactionbasis.Thus,after‐marketsupportofsovereignissuanceno
longer stands the scrutiny of the selfish. The changes the authors note,
then, are another manifestation that reputation does not matter the way
it once did.
4 In that regard, the extended quote from Daron Acemoglu
in the paper fits nicely in that line of reasoning.
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of a more complicated bargain with governments. In particular, for a
considerable period governments issued debt in ways in which auction
theorists predict was unlikely to generate the most revenue from the
sales. Sovereign sales are examples of common‐value auctions, where
participants in the auction have readings on the values of the items sold
by a variety of means. Selling such debts by an underwriting syndicate
similarly ranks low in expected revenue. In both, the selling format does
not release information when it matters to demanders and lowers ex-
pected revenue from sales.
5 Perhaps, in return for granting this subsidy
in the primary market, governments might have required those firms to
participate in the secondary market trading. In the United States, for in-
stance, primary dealers in U.S. Treasury securities had advantages in
Treasury auctions and responsibilities to the Treasury in secondary
markets. In recent years, Treasury issuers have taken to the lessons of
auction theorists and moved to single‐price auctions, which are more
efficientingeneratingrevenue.Butifthereislessmoneyleftonthetable
in the primary market, investment banks will put less effort in second-
ary markets.
Fifth, changes in market behavior over time might merely reflect a
maturation of markets associated with sustained economic growth
and increases in wealth. As more capital moves into investment bank-
ing, the more generalized search for higher returns might lower returns
for all. Simply put, as capital flows further and further out into the
fields, returns fall and we observe more competition and more turn-
over. That competition probably lowers fees and underwriting but also
involves less after‐issuance protection. A good example comes to mind
from the changes in the institutional trading of equities on the New
York Stock Exchange in the mid‐1970s. Mid‐decade, fixed‐rate commis-
sions were outlawed. Not long after, commissions per share for large
trades fell precipitately, volume increased, but investment banks
devoted less of their equity into the business.
In sum, Flandreau et al.’s explanation is plausible but not necessarily
unique. One hopes that differentiation among the explanations might be
possible by looking at other data. Is market power about the size of the
firm in that market or the absolute size of the firm? And what happened
to profits and share prices of financial firms? What is the trend to the
average transaction cost over time? This is a fascinating paper, and the
authors deserve our appreciation in building a new data set. The paper
increasesthe profession’s understanding and will no doubt bethe first of
many more to come on the topic.
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1. As discussed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
2. Ferguson (1999) reviews the importance of gathering and interpreting information in
creating the investment banking institution.
3. The IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard is described at http://dsbb.imf.org/
Applications/web/sddshome/.
4. This is an argument I made in a chapter in a recent Federal Reserve volume, The
Benefits of Playing Well, available at http://www.aei.org/speech/100064. Essentially,
the incentives put on the table associated with complicated financial, accounting, and
tax regulations made inroads on market discipline.
5. This is described in Reinhart (1992).
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